In the wake of the Great Recession, steep declines in state and local government expenditures and employment were a large and persistent source of economic weakness. The business cycle was also characterized by large increases and decreases in household debt. We estimate the extent to which variation in local government revenues and expenditures can be explained by variation in the expansion of household debt from 2002 to 2007, and the contraction thereafter. We merge individual credit balance data with municipal fi nancial data from the Census of Governments. Using Census block indicators, we are able to place approximately 12 million credit bureau records into over 6,000 cities and 4,500 school districts. Our results indicate that a one percent additional increase in mortgage debt caused a 0.15 percent increase in local governments' own revenue and a 0.17 to 0.21 percent increase in expenditures. These relationships were evident during the expansion and contraction of mortgage debt. We also fi nd evidence linking nonmortgage debt to municipal fi nances. 
Introduction
The business cycle of the last twelve years featured two unusual trends. The objective of this analysis is to quantify the connection between household debt and municipal finances. Using the precise geographic location of borrowers in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax data, we are able to place borrowers in the jurisdiction observed in the Census of Governments. Using the variation between cities, we can observe the extent to which the expansion and contraction of household credit affected local government revenues. We would expect municipal finances to reflect the business cycle to some extent, although, as mentioned above, they historically held steady through downturns. Cross-sectionally, jurisdictions with growing populations need to increase their revenues and expenditures for any services that are scalable rather than purely nonrival public goods. Likewise, if municipal services are a normal good, we should see municipal revenues and expenditures rise where incomes rise. We posit the mechanism for expansion beyond income and population growth is as follows. In past recessions that were caused by the misallocation of investment capital, such as the dot-com bubble, municipal finances would mainly be indirectly impacted by wealth effects among households that held related stocks. On the other hand, the extensive and intensive expansion of mortgage credit in the mid-2000s fed directly into the largest local government revenue source via property values. Also, since homes are much more widely owned than any investment security, their appreciation could induce additional consumer spending among a much larger fraction of households. This increased spending feeds into sales tax revenue.
This analysis treats the expansion of household credit as an exogenous shock that hit municipalities to varying degrees. The local tax base expands more if more local residents were marginal borrowers (they could only get credit during the period of lowered underwriting standards), if land was available for new construction, if home price appreciation was greater, or if the municipality had regional shopping centers to capture increasing retail sales. Municipalities could respond by raising tax rates and providing additional services, by leaving rates unchanged, or by lowering their tax rates. Later, in the aftermath of the recession and in the face of falling income tax, sales tax and intergovernmental revenues, local governments could raise their tax rates to offset the declines. Our estimates are a characterization of the net changes in the municipalities' fiscal outcomes given the shock of the credit cycle and the municipalities' responses.
In hindsight, the expansion of household credit was unsustainable. During the expansion, millions of homebuyers and investors made financial decisions that imply they believed the expansion was permanent. These same people, as voters, did not cut tax rates and lower expenditures so that when the credit expansion eventually reversed, they would have a smooth continuity of municipal services. Rather, it appears that local governments did not distin-guish between revenue growth supported by fundamentals and revenue growth supported by intertemporal transfers of consumption. This is evident in the positive association between household credit balances and local government revenue and spending, during the expansion, recession, and recovery. The revenue and expenditure increases that are explained by the household debt changes are in addition to the increases that can be explained by population and income growth. This paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a literature review of the connection between home values, personal debt, and the local fiscal conditions. We then describe the empirical model and data, and then we present the results in Section 4. Finally, Section 2 concludes.
Literature
Since the recession of [2007] [2008] , numerous articles have documented the links between home values, household debt, and the business cycle. The recent iteration of this line of literature began with Mian and Sufi demonstrating that household leverage in 2006 was a strong predictor of the severity of the recession in US counties (2010b). On several measures, including purchases of durables, consumer defaults, house prices, employment, and residential investment, declines during and after the recession were more severe in the counties where household leverage had grown the most during the expansion. Mian and Sufi argued that this household leverage cycle was a primary driver of the last recession, and the household deleveraging that continued after the recession was largely responsible for the slow growth in the following years (2010a). The variation in household leverage that allows the authors to identify its impact of that leverage on economic activity arose from an intersection of expanded access to credit and restrictions on the supply of housing (2011). In regions with elastic housing supply, the extension of credit to marginal borrowers was met with expanded housing construction. In regions with topographic and regulatory restrictions on construc-tion, the credit expansion drove strong increases in home prices. Home price increases resulted in greater household expenditures via a wealth effect; the higher home values enabled credit-constrained households to take on additional nonmortgage debt by leveraging their home equity.
Brown, Stein and Zafar also showed, using credit report data from 1999 to 2012, that all types of homeowners increased both housing and nonhousing debt as a result of the housing boom (2013). However, the authors find substantial differences across borrower ages and creditworthiness. Older and prime borrowers substitute out of credit card debt and into home equity debt when house prices increase, and the reverse when prices decline, reflecting a portfolio reallocation and little net change in nonmortgage debt. Young and marginally creditworthy borrowers are much more cyclical, taking on more total nonmortgage debt during housing booms and shedding it during housing busts.
Relationships between home values and household debt have been found in UK data (Disney and Gathergood, 2011; Gathergood, 2012) and peer-to-peer lending data in the US (Ramcharan and Crowe, 2013) . Connections between home equity and aggregate consumption have been found in Canadian data (Kartashova and Tomlin, 2013) . Gabe and Florida estimated the overall link between housing prices and employment (2013), supplementing Mian and Sufi's finding of the linkage between household leverage and employment.
The literature that relates the business cycle to the fortunes of municipalities is older, but it has also received renewed attention since the financial crisis of 2008. Research using pre-crisis data considered the sensitivity of state and local revenue streams to macroeconomic conditions (Berg et al., 2000; Hildreth and Miller, 2014; Seyfried and Pantuosco, 2003; Wagner and Elder, 2007; Garrett, 2009; Carroll, 2009) . McCubbins and Moule found that tax and expenditure limits tend to increase the pro-cyclicality of municipal revenues (2010).
Rodden and Wibbels examined seven countries with decentralized federal governments and found that intergovernmental transfers cannot overcome the cyclical nature of the subnational governments revenues (2010) . McGranahan recently surveyed the changes in state tax revenue following the recession (2012).
Balanced budget requirements generally link changes in state and local expenditures to changes in revenues. Studies of state expenditures find that, like revenues, they are at least moderately pro-cyclical (Levinson, 1998; Hines, 2010; Craig and Hoang, 2011; Abbott and Jones, 2012) . Skidmore and Scorsone used microdata on local governments in Michigan to estimate the fiscal responses to financial distress (2011). They found that municipalities facing revenue declines curtailed capital spending, but generally maintained public safety spending. Bellante and Porter presented evidence of a ratchet theory of local government employment in which government employment is increased during expansions but not de- Two recent studies have explored the relationship between cyclicality and municipal debt.
Wang and Hou set out to contrast the volatility of capital expenditures under systems of bond financing and pay-as-you-go financing (2009). Chino, Choi, and Rice were interested in public sector unions (2013). They argue that stronger unions increase the use of public debt during fiscal downturns because they reduce the municipality's fiscal flexibility. While our research relates to the business cycle and local government fiscal responses, it is focused on a particular channel of the business cycle, that of household credit.
In the literature that has been published since the most recent recession, links between housing and state and local finance have been explored. Studies of single states have been undertaken in cases where researchers had very localized house price measures and local government fiscal data. Doerner and Ihlanfeldt find small increases in tax revenues, including property taxes, in Florida municipalities with rising home values (Doerner and Ihlanfeldt, 2011) . The experience in Georgia was similar, with the stability of property tax revenues delaying and cushioning the shocks of the recession for local governments (Alm et al., 2011) .
Vlaicu and Whalley's study of California finds a large response in property tax revenue in the presence of real estate appreciation, despite the Proposition 13 limit on assessed value growth (2011). They also identify offsetting reductions in other local government revenues.
Chernick, Langley, and Reschovsky forecasted fiscal responses to the housing crisis in the largest US cities (2011). They found minimal impacts of house depreciation on property tax revenue during their study period. Estimates of state and metro-area aggregates of local government revenues and expenditures are also available annually based on a sampling of smaller cities and districts. Lutz used aggregate observations in the housing-boom period and estimated a one percent increase in housing prices led to a 0.4 percent increase in property tax revenue (2008). Lutz, Molloy, and Shan used state aggregates to estimate that house price declines reduced state tax revenues by 3 percent between 2006 and 2009 (2011) . They found minimal impacts of house depreciation on property tax revenue during their study period, which they attribute to the lag in property tax assessments.
We think we are improving on the published studies in several ways. We are using national microdata sets, rather than a single state's data, aggregate data, or data limited to very large cities. Our disaggregated analysis at the state level demonstrates the great variation between states, which limits the usefulness of single-state findings. Using state aggregates fails to leverage the variation that exists within states and between normal-sized jurisdictions to identify the connection between household expenditures and local government revenue. Finally, our data recognizes that most of the population of the US lives in smaller jurisdictions that cannot diversify their tax revenue streams to the extent a major city can.
Data

Household Debt
The household debt data are created using samples drawn from the Equifax Consumer Credit 
Government Finances
We turn to the U.S. Census Bureau's Census of Governments (2002 Governments ( , 2007 and Annual Survey of Governments (2011) For the city specifications, we examine five revenue variables, all measured in changes:
own-source general revenue, which covers all types of revenue except intergovernmental; property taxes; sales taxes; income taxes; and fee revenue. On the expenditure side, we examine the change in the following variables: total operating expenditures; wages and salaries; benefits; public safety (police, fire, corrections, courts, and safety inspections); water and sewage; roads; and parks and recreation. Finally, we also look at the change in the public debt outstanding. For the school district specifications, we examine changes in five variables: own revenue, property taxes, fees, total operating expenditures, and public debt outstanding.
We note that the sample sizes differ depending on which years we examine. 
Demographic Controls
The demographic controls used throughout the analysis are derived from the 2000 Decennial likely be understated because they are based on two sets of samples that overlap. These differences will also be reflected in the coefficients on our household debt measures, which is an additional reason why the coefficients of interest are not perfectly comparable between the pre-and post-crisis periods.
The baseline demographic measures are intended to account for the type of municipality, while the changes reflect how it is evolving. Higher representation of certain types of households, such as married couples with young children, may have caused both growing debt levels and growing municipal expenditures. Controlling for these attributes of the cities helps us to isolate the marginal effect of the credit expansion itself. are used in both estimates. We annualize the population and income changes in both periods to improve the comparability of the coefficients, but the coefficients should still be interpreted with caution. We do believe the understatement of the population and income changes between the overlapping five-year estimates should be both consistent across all tracts and orthogonal to the variables of interest. They are the best available measures and sufficient as controls. Tables 1 and 2 Population growth continued at a modest pace, but income growth, on average, was negative in the sampled cities.
Descriptive Statistics
Empirical Model Specification
In our analysis, we have scaled all revenue and expenditure changes by the municipality or district's total expenditures in the base year. We did not want to equate "50 percent increases" in two cities if, for example, the change in one city was sales tax revenue rising from 4 to 6 percent of expenditures while in another city it was rising from 40 to 60 percent.
We trimmed changes that were below -100 percent and above 300 percent. In these cases, we feel there may be data errors, or major restructuring (unincorporations, mergers, etc.) that cause the changes to not be meaningful. The same trimming (<-100, >300 percent) is applied to the changes in mortgage and consumer debt. Bond issuances are often multiple of annual expenditures, so they were trimmed at -250 and 750 percent of expenditures.
In our regressions, we weight the city observations by their population as estimated with the 2005-2009 ACS. This weighting allows us to make statements about the experience of the average American city resident. Without the weighting, the small municipalities would dominate the estimation, and our results would mainly speak to the experience of the fifth of the population that lives in cities with populations below 10,000.
Most specifications include measures of the change in nonmortgage debt, income and population measured at two geographic levels-the jurisdiction and its surrounding county.
This specification recognizes that a city's tax base includes all the residents of neighboring cities who patronize the stores, restaurants, auto dealerships, etc. in the city's jurisdiction.
For cities that host a regional shopping center, a majority of their sales tax revenue could be derived from nonresidents. Therefore, the expanded indebtedness of households in neighboring cities could cause revenue and expenditure growth, just as growing county incomes and populations could. Because cities in the same county share the same estimates of consumer debt, income, and population, we cluster the error on the county in each specification.
Results
Main Results
We now move to estimated results from our econometric model. In the tables that follow, the dependent variable will be changes in municipality revenues or expenditures, either for a period before the recession or after the recession. The key covariate of interest will be the change in mortgage balances in the same period.
We begin by examining local revenues during the expansion period of 2002 to 2007. As given in table 3, during this period, the growth of households' mortgage balances in a city appears to have caused increases in all the major types of municipal revenue. In table 3, we see that in the presence of controls for population, income, and intergovernmental transfers, a one percent increase in mortgage balances outstanding for residents of a city increases the city's revenue by 0.15 percent of its 2002 expenditures. A one standard deviation increase in mortgage balances (41.8) would cause a one-quarter of a standard deviation (6.2) increase in the growth of own-source revenue. This increase appears primarily in property taxes and fees. In contrast, if city and county incomes and populations were all one standard deviation higher, this would only imply higher own-revenue on the order of 11 percent of a standard deviation. The coefficients in table 3 on the consumer debt balances of city residents are all positive, but not statistically significant. In the case of county residents' consumer debt balances, the model detects a strong positive impact on property tax revenue.
Next, table 4 report results from the local expenditures model during the expansion period. They suggest significant positive impacts of mortgage and consumer credit expansion on total expenditures. A one standard deviation difference in mortgage debt growth is associated with one-fifth of a standard deviation of growth in total expenditures. A one standard deviation difference (27) in consumer debt of the city's residents is associated with 2.8 percentage points, or 7.2 percent of a standard deviation of expenditure growth.
As the revenue growth came from multiple sources, a variety of expenditures also appears responsive to household debt. Salaries, public safety, water, roads, and parks expenditures all have positive coefficients relating their growth to that of household indebtedness.
In the post-recession period, we can estimate similar models, but the differences should be kept in mind. Rather than a full census, the 2011 municipal finance data is a survey that covers all large cities and a sampling of smaller cities. The population, income, and demographic controls are all estimated with American Community Survey five-year aggregates.
Despite the substantial difference in the direction and magnitude of the changes in mortgage debt and municipal revenue, the coefficients relating the two are similar in the periods of housing boom and housing bust. In the bust, table 5 shows that a one percent higher mortgage credit balance growth is associated with 0.15 percent higher growth in own-source revenue. The portion coming through property taxes is .04 (compared to .06 in 2002-07), and the coefficient in the fees model is 0.8. Growth (or a lesser decline) in consumer credit balance for residents of the surrounding county is also associated with higher growth in revenue, but in the 2007-2011 period, this appears in fee revenue rather than property taxes.
In the 2007-2011 expenditures models (table 5), mortgage debt growth is related to expenditure growth by a highly significant coefficient of 0.21. This is comparable to the coefficient of 0.17 in the pre-2007 period. Again, mortgage debt growth is significantly positively related to spending on public safety, water and sewage, roads, and parks. The relationship between the expansion of consumer credit and municipal expenditures is not significant in most cases, which is different from the pre-2007 results. In the case of expenditures on roads, the model returns a significant negative coefficient on the change in city residents' consumer debt balances. Tables 7 and 8 present the results of the models in which the household debt, revenues, expenditures, and income variables are all converted to per capita terms. In this specification, the relationship between mortgage debt expansion and revenues and expenditures is quite similar to that seen in the models with population as a control. The more remarkable change is in the estimates of the impacts of consumer debt. In ten of the eighteen models, the expansion of consumer debt by the resident of the city is estimated to have significant positive effect on revenues or expenditures. In several instances, a significant negative relationship between consumer credit changes at the county level appears to offset the impact of the same measure at the city level.
Models estimated using school districts rather than cities have similar results. The specification is simpler because school districts' funding is concentrated in property taxes and intergovernmental revenue. Over three-quarters of school districts report no sales tax revenue, so we omit the consumer credit measures. The estimates presented in table 9 suggest that for each additional one percentage point increase in mortgage debt outstanding for the school district's residents corresponded to additional own-source revenue equal to 0.04 percent of 2002 total expenditures and a 0.05 percent greater increase in total expenditures.
Intergovernmental revenue and property taxes appear to be substitutes. Revenue and spending both display stronger positive correlations with mortgage growth in the recession and recovery period. Table 10 presents alternative specifications of ten models from tables 3 and 4. When the models are estimated without the demographic controls and without any controls, we can see that the coefficients relating mortgage credit growth to revenues and expenditures remain fairly steady. Apparently mortgage balance growth is not highly correlated with any of the controls. In sharp contrast, it appears that some of the demographic controls are absorbing substantial explanatory variation that would otherwise be attributed to the expansion of consumer credit for city residents. Without the demographic controls, there are large significant coefficients relating consumer credit growth to each type of revenue and expenditure.
Alternate Specifications
Removing the county variables for consumer credit growth, population growth, and income growth (see table 11) also results in significant coefficients relating consumer credit expansion to revenue from property taxes and all own sources, as well as expenditures on salaries, public safety, water, and roads. Table 12 presents models estimated for California, the three other sand states, and the balance of the US. California is an interesting case because it had high levels of home-price appreciation during the study period, but it also has limitations on how quickly property taxes can rise. The coefficient relating the growth of mortgage debt and property tax revenue is 0.083 in California, well above the 0.015 observed in the non-sand states. Evidently, turnover was sufficient to allow California's cities to raise assessments. The relationship between mortgage growth and own-source revenues and expenditures is much stronger when estimated on Arizona, Florida, and Nevada. Including state fixed effects in a pooled model leads to only modest changes in the results.
Dividing the data and estimating the models for small/large and growing/steady places (see tables 13 and 14) reveals that the relationships between mortgage growth, total revenues, and total expenditures are larger in magnitude in growing and large places. However, neither growing nor large places are driving the pooled results alone. Places with steady populations and places with smaller populations both display significant positive coefficients in almost every model, primarily for mortgage growth.
Conclusions
The aim of this research was to quantify the relationship between household debt and mu- To avoid being caught in future cyclical swings of household debt, cities could set their revenue targets as functions of their population or aggregate household income. Alternately, before setting millages, sales tax rates, or income tax brackets, they could set a dollar amount of revenue as a collection goal. They would then have to recalibrate their tax rates at least annually to equate their revenue with the target amount. While more complicated to implement, this system would place the share of the tax incidence according to residents' housing wealth, consumption, or income, as intended. 
